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The Panama Papers and foreign trusts
On 3 April 2016 the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and the German newspaper 
Süddeutsche Zeitung announced that for the past year they 
had been analysing a cache of 11.5 million records, now 
known as the Panama Papers, taken from the Panamanian 
law firm Mossack Fonseca. The cache included documents 
relating to trusts and companies in several tax havens. The 
ICIJ gave details of a number of users or beneficial owners  
of these structures. Sixty thousand of the records related to 
New Zealand.
At the time of writing, relatively few of 
the Panama Papers have been analysed, 
but it appears that most New Zealand-
related records involve what are known 
as ‘foreign trusts’. A number of New 
Zealand companies specialise in setting 
up and operating foreign trusts for non-
residents. Solicitors and accountants often 
provide the same service. The industry 
is thought to earn over $25 million a 
year (Pullar-Strecker, 2016), though the 
present author suspects that the sum is 
rather more.
‘Foreign trust’ is a concept of the 
Income Tax Act 2007. Broadly speaking, 
and over-simplifying, a foreign trust 
has one or more New Zealand-resident 
trustees but no New Zealand-source 
income and no settlor or settlors who 
are or were resident in New Zealand. 
Beneficiary residence does not matter, 
since residents of New Zealand, and 
thus beneficiaries of any trust who are 
resident in New Zealand, must pay tax 
on all income wherever it comes from. 
Nevertheless, in practice few foreign 
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trusts have beneficiaries that reside in 
New Zealand. That is, counter-intuitively, 
a ‘foreign trust’ is a trust with at least 
one New Zealand-resident trustee where 
the settlor and income are foreign. 
Generally speaking, as will be explained, 
New Zealand does not tax the income of 
foreign trusts.
The concern with foreign trusts is 
that in addition to legitimate uses, New 
Zealand foreign trusts can be employed 
to avoid or evade income tax of other 
countries, to hold stolen wealth, or 
as repositories for profits from illegal 
activities.
On 11 April 2016 the government 
appointed John Shewan to investigate 
foreign trusts, to report and to make 
recommendations as to what, if anything, 
should be done about them. His report 
(Shewan, 2016) was published on 27 
June. In summary, Shewan recommends 
that New Zealand should maintain a 
register of foreign trusts, including their 
deeds, that discloses settlor(s), protector 
(if any), trustees and beneficiaries 
(with provisions for beneficiaries of 
discretionary trusts) (p.3). The objective 
is to provide information that Inland 
Revenue and certain other authorities can 
search if need be to respond to inquiries 
from foreign tax administrations and 
other foreign officials, such as people 
charged with investigating money 
laundering. The ministers of finance 
and revenue responded on 13 July 2016, 
adopting the recommendations of the 
report with few modifications (English 
and Woodhouse, 2016). This article 
addresses the issue of foreign trusts in 
general, together with some aspects of 
Shewan’s report. The article focuses on 
income tax, although the report itself is 
more wide-ranging. Some knowledge of 
the history and nature of trusts and of 
international taxation may help readers 
to understand the issues.
History and nature of trusts
A trust is better thought of as a remedy or 
a relationship than as an entity. The trust 
developed within the common law (that 
is, judge-made law) in mediaeval England. 
For instance, when a baron accompanied 
the king on a crusade he might convey the 
title to his castle to his neighbour. Having 
legal title to the castle, the neighbour could 
repel adverse claims, both in court and by 
force if necessary. But what happened if 
the neighbour refused to re-convey the 
castle on the crusader’s return? Since the 
crusader had voluntarily granted legal 
title to the neighbour, the common law 
offered no remedy.
Such injustice offended the conscience 
of the king, and, by later delegation, of 
the king’s lord chancellor, and then of the 
courts of equity. The remedy was to throw 
the neighbour into prison until he gave 
common law title to the castle back to the 
crusader. That is, the system of law that 
came to be known as ‘equity’ did not itself 
effect justice, but compelled defendants 
to act justly within the common law. 
Equity operates in the same way today, to 
prevent people from abusing their rights 
under the common law.
The crusader’s remedy came to 
be institutionalised as the trust. In 
conveying title to the neighbour, the 
crusader was a settlor who settled 
property on trust. In accepting the 
property subject to obligations to hold 
it for the benefit of the crusader and to 
return it to him the neighbour became 
a trustee. The beneficiaries of the trust 
were the crusader, or his heirs if he did 
not return. The example illustrates that, 
in contrast to, say, a company, the trust 
is fundamentally a remedy rather than an 
entity. It is also a creation of the common 
law, not of statute.
Property owners began to use the 
trusts paradigm to answer other needs. 
For instance, when they foresaw that 
they would not be able to look after their 
property personally they ‘settled’ their 
property on trustees to look after it and 
eventually to distribute it to beneficiaries. 
A primary example is the deceased estate. 
The law, and common sense, forbad 
testators from leaving property directly to 
infants, so testators appointed trustees to 
hold their property after death, to pay or 
to retain income from the property, and 
to distribute the capital in due course.
Flexibility of trusts
At this point, a particular quality of the 
common law becomes relevant. Essential-
ly, the common law permits people to 
do anything that is not forbidden. That 
is why, with few exceptions, parties can 
form binding contracts to do almost 
anything. Trusts reflect the same 
quality of flexibility. Subject to very few 
restrictions, settlors can specify precisely 
how capital and income of a trust must 
be distributed (fixed trusts), or they 
can leave decisions wholly or partly to 
the discretion of the trustee, or even of 
someone else (discretionary trusts). Trusts 
can substitute for the settlor, for instance, 
after death, as explained, or they can 
protect assets: from corrupt governments 
intent on looting their citizens; from tax 
gatherers; or from creditors and spouses. 
Trusts can sometimes protect, or at least 
hide, assets stolen from the true owner.
The basis for this flexibility is that 
trust law recognises that property may 
be subject to two forms of ownership 
at the same time. Legal ownership vests 
in the trustee, whose name appears on 
titles and registers if ownership must be 
recorded. Beneficial ownership resides 
in the beneficiaries, but that ownership 
may in practice be both unknowable and 
tentative: unknowable to anyone who does 
not know that the title holder to property 
The concern with foreign trusts is that in 
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is only a trustee; and provisional because 
beneficiaries’ interests may depend on 
the exercise of a discretion that has not 
occurred.
Trusts can be so flexible that the same 
person may be at the same time all of 
settlor, trustee and beneficiary, although 
where a trust has only one person in all 
these roles the three roles are likely to 
merge, leaving no trust: only one person 
holding the property as beneficial owner. 
Instead, careful drafting can ensure that 
merger does not occur.
Broadly speaking, national borders 
do not trouble the common law. The 
law will, for example, enforce a trust 
settled in one country, administered 
in a second and holding property in a 
third, with trustees resident in a fourth 
or fifth, and beneficiaries scattered in a 
sixth or seventh. A trustee of one trust 
may hold some or all of the property 
for the trustee of a second trust, the first 
often a ‘custodian trustee’, with no duties 
other than to obey the commands of the 
second. Paradigm trustees are individuals, 
known to law as ‘natural persons’, but, 
in the absence of statutory prohibition, 
companies and other incorporations may 
be trustees.
There is no trans-national law of trusts. 
A common law court applies the ‘proper 
law’ of the trust, being the law of the 
jurisdiction that is most closely connected 
with the trust in question, which may not 
be the law of the jurisdiction where the 
court sits. A trust deed may authorise the 
settlor to override the ‘closest connection’ 
test and, within wide limits, expressly 
choose the proper law to be applied. 
The deed may authorise the trustees to 
move the trust’s administrative centre to 
another jurisdiction, usually appointing 
new trustees and replacing the proper law 
at the same time.
Fixed and discretionary trusts
In the paradigm of a trust the interests 
of beneficiaries are fixed. For instance, 
a trustee of an estate may hold the 
property of the estate to pay the income 
to the testator’s widow during her life, 
and, at her death, to transfer the property 
to the testator’s daughter. Or a testator 
may leave her property to trustees to sell 
the property and to divide the proceeds 
equally between her three children.
Discretionary trusts are different 
and take the concept of flexibility to 
another level. The settlor or testator may 
authorise the trustee to divide property 
between beneficiaries according to the 
discretion of the trustee or of another 
nominated person. Often, a trust will 
empower the trustee to omit one or 
more beneficiaries altogether. A trust 
deed may name and precisely identify 
beneficiaries, or simply define them, 
for instance by reference to a common 
grandfather. That is, trustees take 
decisions about dividing trust property 
that settlors would take themselves if 
they retained the property.
The rule in Saunders v Vautier 1 
provides that if all beneficiaries are of 
full age and absolutely entitled (that 
is, broadly, there is no other possible 
beneficiary), the beneficiaries may 
combine to require the trustee to transfer 
the property to themselves. A settlor can 
prevent this result by, for instance, adding 
a charity as a beneficiary. There may never 
be any intention for property to go to the 
charity, but its presence as a beneficiary 
means that the family members or 
others who are the substantive target of 
the settlor’s benevolence cannot compel 
the trustee to terminate the trust. It is 
probably for this or similar technical 
reasons that a number of well-known 
charities appeared as beneficiaries of 
New Zealand trusts that were identified 
in Mossack Fonseca’s documents. If so, it 
is unlikely that there was any intention of 
passing property to the charities.
Creation and drafting of trusts
People can create trusts orally, by 
informal action, or even by accident, if 
they inadvertently put themselves under 
fiduciary obligations to others. (‘Fiduciary’ 
obligations arise where one party owes 
special duties to put the interests of 
the other ahead of his or her own. For 
instance, although the law in general 
allows contracting parties to exact from 
each other whatever profit they honestly 
can, an agent must not profit at the 
expense of her principal. Likewise, unless 
there is provision in the document that 
creates the trust, trustees must not profit 
from the trust property.) Nevertheless, 
most trusts are created formally, by 
recording their terms in a deed, which, 
in the present context, means essentially 
a formal document where signatures are 
witnessed.
Trust deeds are complex, but lawyers 
who practise in the area have well-
developed precedents, so the drafting 
process is undemanding for the most 
part. Many provisions of deeds exist 
to replace common or statute law that 
would otherwise apply by default. Other 
provisions are calculated to ensure that 
the trusts in question do indeed have 
the tax effects that their authors intend. 
Mistakes are rare, especially in deeds that 
are drafted to create trusts that are to be 
employed in tax planning.
The courts tend to take deeds at 
face value. For instance, it is common 
for someone to settle a trust that is to 
be used by an unrelated family. Later, 
the substantive settlor may transfer 
property to the trust. The objective is to 
circumvent legislation that imposes tax 
obligations that are defined in terms of 
settlors of trusts. As far as New Zealand 
income tax is concerned, section HC 27 
of the Income Tax Act 2007 frustrates 
that stratagem by treating anyone who 
transfers wealth to a trust as a settlor.
Problems of the regulation of trusts
Before considering the problems that 
trusts pose for international tax policy, it 
People can create trusts orally, by 
informal action, or even by accident, if 
they inadvertently put themselves under 
fiduciary obligations to others.
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is helpful to list a number of the challenges 
that trusts pose to any regulatory 
authority: 
•	 Unlike	companies,	which	are	
created by the state (mostly under 
the Companies Act 1993), trusts 
are constructs of the common law. 
Just as for contracts or wills, or for 
private correspondence for that 
matter, there is no automatic way for 
the state to find out about trusts or 
to compose a register.
•	 Beneficial	ownership	is	separated	
from legal ownership and 
possession, which means that 
it may be hard to discover the 
beneficial owners of property held 
by trustees.
•	 Moreover,	where	a	law	provides	for	
registration of ownership, such as 
in the Land Transfer Act 1952, not 
only is it not customary to require 
registration of beneficial ownership, 
but it may be forbidden.2
•	 Trust	deeds	may	be	so	drafted	
that the anticipated beneficiaries 
are identified by reference but not 
named, and may not be identified for 
many years.
•	 Conversely,	the	named	beneficiary	
may be a charity or other not-for-
profit organisation that the settlor 
and trustees never intend to benefit. 
As mentioned, this may explain 
why New Zealand trusts among the 
Panama Papers name a number of 
charities.
•	 A	trust	may	empower	the	settlor,	or	
someone else, to add beneficiaries 
at a later date. That is, not only are 
these additional beneficiaries not 
named in the deed; they are not 
even described by reference except in 
rather general terms.
The international tax system
Like most countries, New Zealand employs 
‘source’ and ‘residence’ to determine 
whether income is taxable, taxing:
•	 all	income	that	has	its	source	in	this	
country, whether derived by residents 
or by non-residents; and
•	 all	income	derived	by	residents,	
whether having a New Zealand 
source or a foreign source.
There are two important 
consequences. First, some income risks 
double taxation. For example, interest 
that a New Zealand resident earns in 
the	 United	 States	 is	 potentially	 taxed	
in both countries. The same applies to, 
for instance, fees, salaries, dividends, 
royalties and so on. Like other countries, 
New Zealand mitigates this burden in a 
number of ways. The Income Tax Act 
exempts certain foreign-source income 
from New Zealand taxation. In respect 
of some other income, the act grants 
New Zealand residents credit for foreign 
taxes imposed at source, subtracting the 
credit from New Zealand tax imposed 
on the same income. In addition to 
these unilateral measures, New Zealand 
has entered some 40 bilateral treaties 
that operate in the same way, but that 
are usually more generous towards 
the taxpayer than is the statute. These 
treaties are known variously as double 
tax treaties, agreements or conventions.
The second consequence is that where 
income does not have a New Zealand 
source and is not derived by a New 
Zealand resident, New Zealand makes no 
claim to tax. This is not surprising: why 
would New Zealand tax, for instance, a 
French resident on salary that he earns 
in Switzerland? But the principle goes 
further. Suppose that the Frenchman 
trusts neither French banks nor Swiss 
banks and asks his employer to pay the 
salary into an account at the Wellington 
branch of the Bank of New Zealand. 
Again, not surprisingly, New Zealand taxes 
neither the employee nor the bank on the 
salary, though New Zealand does impose 
tax on interest that the bank may pay or 
on fees that it charges, both the interest 
and the fees having a New Zealand source 
and the fees being earned by a company 
that is resident in New Zealand. We will 
call this structure, where foreigners cause 
foreign-source income that they derive to 
be paid to a New Zealand bank, Model 1. 
As explained, New Zealand has no reason 
to tax the income of Model 1 when the 
bank receives it.
New Zealand trust taxation
Unlike	 companies,	 trusts	 are	 not	 legal	
persons. That is, trusts’ existence 
comprises only their settlors, trustees, 
beneficiaries and trust property, and 
the interrelationships between them. In 
contrast, companies have an existence 
independent of their shareholders and 
directors, albeit a fictional existence 
created by the law. For trusts, it follows 
that the law taxes not the trust, but the 
trustee or the beneficiary. If trustees 
distribute income to beneficiaries in 
the year when the trustees derive it the 
beneficiaries are taxed, broadly speaking as 
if they derived the income directly rather 
than via the trust.3 Following the rules 
explained under the previous heading, 
tax bites if the beneficiaries are resident 
in New Zealand or if the income has a 
New Zealand source. If the income has a 
foreign source and the trustee pays it to 
a foreign-resident beneficiary there is no 
tax. Generally, the same applies for both 
fixed and discretionary trusts. We will call 
this structure Model 2.
In policy terms, Model 2 reflects 
Model 1. In Model 1 the source of the 
income is Swiss (foreign) and the owner 
of the income is French (also foreign). 
Using	a	New	Zealand	bank	to	look	after	
the income should not, and does not, 
make any difference to the fiscal status 
of the income as far as New Zealand 
is concerned. In Model 2 the income 
is again foreign, as is the beneficial 
Using New Zealand-resident trustees to 
look after the income should not, and does 
not, make any difference to the income’s 
fiscal status as far as New Zealand is 
concerned.
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owner of the income, the beneficiary. 
Using	 New	 Zealand-resident	 trustees	
to look after the income should not, 
and does not, make any difference to 
the income’s fiscal status as far as New 
Zealand is concerned. True, there is a 
legal difference between the bank and 
the trustee. Legally the bank is the 
debtor of the French account holder, 
whereas the trustees, as trustees, are the 
legal owners of the income as it passes 
through their hands or as they add it to 
the funds of the trust. But, economically, 
the bank and the trustee perform similar 
functions of looking after someone else’s 
income. There is no reason of principle 
for the tax consequences to differ.
So much for income that trustees pass 
on to beneficiaries. Income accumulated 
by trustees presents different problems 
for tax policy makers. Since trustees must 
not personally enjoy their trust income, 
one might suppose that they should not 
pay tax on it. But that result would allow 
trustees to defer tax for as long as they 
chose. The solution is to tax retained 
trust income to trustees, treating them 
as taxpayers who are additional to their 
personal taxpayer status. That is, trustees 
are taxpayers in respect of their personal 
income at the same time as being as many 
taxpayers as there are trusts of which they 
are trustees. If the source of the income 
is in New Zealand there are no issues: 
the income is simply taxable on the basis 
of the source rule discussed above. But 
what questions arise if the income comes 
from abroad? The answer depends on the 
residence of the settlor.
New Zealand foreign trusts
If the settlor is resident in New Zealand, 
the statute taxes the trustee.4 This is so 
whether the trustee is resident in New 
Zealand or abroad. But if a foreign-
resident trustee does not pay, then the 
settlor must pay, treated as agent for 
the trustee.5 The policy logic is that if 
the settlor had retained the income-
producing property, and had derived and 
accumulated the income, New Zealand 
would tax the settlor. It should make no 
difference that the settlor has transferred 
the property to a trustee.
If neither the settlor nor the trustee 
is resident in New Zealand, and if the 
income has a foreign source, there is no 
policy reason (or practical ability) for New 
Zealand to tax income that the trustee 
retains. New Zealand simply has no 
connection with the income or relevant 
parties that would justify exacting tax.
The questions that are the subject of 
this article arise where income is foreign 
and settlors reside abroad, but they 
choose trustees resident in New Zealand. 
This structure is known as a ‘foreign trust’. 
An example of a foreign trust might arise 
where, say, Mossack Fonseca has a client 
resident in Malta who wishes to settle 
income-producing property on trust, 
perhaps shares in a company registered 
in Luxembourg. Mossack Fonseca might 
commission a New Zealand law firm or 
trust company to establish a trust with 
a New Zealand-resident trustee for the 
benefit of the Maltese client and his 
family, all resident in Malta. How does 
New Zealand income tax treat dividends 
that the New Zealand trustee derives from 
the Luxembourg company?
If the trustee distributes the dividends 
to the beneficiaries, Model 2 applies. That 
is, foreign-source income goes to foreign-
resident beneficiaries and there is no 
reason for New Zealand to tax. The same 
logic applies if the trustee retains the 
income, which structure may be called 
Model 3. No one resident in New Zealand 
has any interest in the income. From an 
economic perspective the trustee is a 
mere custodian.6 For this reason of fiscal 
policy, New Zealand does not tax trustees 
in a Model 3 or ‘foreign trust’ structure. 
Although it is not obvious at first sight, 
there is no more basic policy reason to 
tax the trustee in Model 3 than there is 
to tax the bank in Model 1 or the trustee 
in Model 2.
A problem arises in that although 
there is no obvious policy reason to 
tax earnings retained under a Model 
3 structure, countries may do so. New 
Zealand charged trustees tax on retained 
foreign-source income until the late 
1980s. Other countries still do. The 
reason is formalistic and legal rather than 
economic. Lawmakers are persuaded that 
since trustees are the legal owners of 
income that arises from trust property, 
that is sufficient reason to tax them, even 
if the residence of the trustee is the only 
connection between the income and the 
taxing jurisdiction. New Zealand rejected 
this reasoning in the 1980s in favour 
of driving tax policy by considerations 
of economic substance rather than of 
legal form. Economic substance leads to 
Model 3, which reflects the paradigm of 
Model 1: that is, no tax on foreign-source 
income derived by non-residents.
The foreign trust ‘regime’ and its ‘exemption’
The Shewan Report calls the tax law 
that applies to foreign trusts, which has 
just been described, the foreign trust 
‘regime’. This is common usage, and is 
for convenience used in this article, but 
the usage can mislead. The reason is that 
there is not truly a ‘regime’ at all: merely 
a category of income that is not taxed 
because it falls outside the reach of the New 
Zealand tax system. ‘Regime’ suggests an 
intended framework, perhaps calculated 
to confer tax benefits. That is not so in 
respect of foreign trusts, where ‘regime’ is 
no more than a shorthand reference to the 
relevant law.
For similar reasons, it can be 
misleading to think of foreign trusts 
as beneficiaries of a tax ‘exemption’ 
(eg Shewan, 2016, p.16). This is true in 
... there is not truly a ‘regime’ at all: 
merely a category of income that is  
not taxed because it falls outside the 
reach of the New Zealand tax  
system
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formal terms, but, as explained above, it 
is no more consistent with fiscal policy 
and logic to tax the income of a typical 
foreign trust than it would be to tax the 
salary of a foreigner who chooses to have 
the salary paid into a New Zealand bank.
Disclosure
Following robust economic policy in 
creating a model for trust taxation reveals 
problems that arise from the nature of 
trusts. Where foreigners desire to hide 
foreign property or income, transferring 
the funds to a New Zealand-resident 
trustee is an attractive option. For reasons 
that have been explained, New Zealand has 
no interest in levying tax on foreigners’ 
foreign-source income and does not do so, 
even if the foreigners choose a New Zealand 
bank or trust to look after that income.
From a New Zealand perspective, 
foreign countries are welcome to tax 
income of their residents that comes to rest 
in a New Zealand trust. Alternatively, the 
foreign country could tax its own resident 
settlors who have contrived this result, as 
New Zealand would in corresponding 
cases of New Zealand settlors. But this is 
a matter of theory. In practice, if no one 
reports the income or the existence of the 
trust, then foreign countries will find it 
difficult or impossible to levy tax.
New Zealand could mitigate foreign 
countries’ enforcement problems by 
advising revenue authorities of New 
Zealand residents who are trustees of 
foreign trusts, or even by discovering 
and forwarding information about 
their	 trustee	 income.	 Until	 2006	 this	
was impossible because there was no 
requirement for New Zealand residents 
to advise New Zealand authorities that 
they were trustees of trusts settled by 
foreigners to derive foreign-source 
income. In 2006 Parliament added 
section 59B to the Tax Administration 
Act 1994, which requires trustees in this 
position to advise Inland Revenue of the 
existence and name of the trust and to 
keep records in case they are asked for 
information. In addition, trustees must 
advise the commissioner if a settlor is 
Australian. The only result was that ‘There 
is now virtually no participation in [New 
Zealand] foreign trusts from Australia’ 
(Shewan, 2016, p.15). Other countries 
rarely ask Inland Revenue about New 
Zealand foreign trusts because they have 
no way of knowing that trusts relevant 
to their inquiries exist. If they suspect 
that their residents have interests in New 
Zealand trusts they cannot advance their 
knowledge without knowing the name of 
the trust, which is most unlikely to offer 
any clues as to the identity or residence of 
interested parties.
Two reasons suggest that New 
Zealand should be more forthcoming 
in providing information to foreign tax 
authorities. The first is that the present 
decade is seeing a major change in 
countries’ policies towards helping each 
other to collect tax in general and in 
exchanging information in particular. 
Historically, countries did not help one 
another to collect tax, but globalisation, 
international concern about tax avoidance 
and increasing international cooperation 
in general have brought about major 
changes in this policy. Countries now 
add extensive mutual assistance and 
information exchange articles to bilateral 
tax treaties; there are numerous bilateral 
tax information exchange agreements; 
and in 2012 New Zealand signed the joint 
OECD/Council of Europe Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters. Cumulatively, 
these measures impose significant duties 
on New Zealand to answer requests from 
treaty partners for taxpayer information. 
New Zealand law must be amended to 
give the government power to respond. 
The second reason for New Zealand to 
be more forthcoming in responding to 
requests from foreign governments for 
information about foreign trusts relates 
to reputation.
Reputation: is New Zealand a tax haven?
‘Tax	haven’	is	not	a	term	of	art.	Use	of	the	
expression can shed more heat than light. 
Nevertheless, the New Zealand foreign 
trust regime raises the question whether 
the country should be so described. The 
OECD suggests that four qualities define 
a tax haven (Shewan, 2016, p.44):
(a) no or only nominal taxes;
(b) lack of effective exchange of 
information;
(c) lack of transparency; and
(d) no substantial activities; to which the 
author would add:
(e) foreign taxpayers’ ability to reduce 
their home country tax in return for 
a toll.
It is true that as a country New 
Zealand does not fit this description, 
but it is equally true that the foreign 
trust regime does. Points (a) and (b) 
are obvious. Point (c) follows from 
the very nature of trusts: unless there 
are specific rules, trusts involve private 
transactions, without the knowledge of 
any authorities. And point (d) applies 
almost by definition to New Zealand 
foreign trusts, where the only onshore 
activity involves trust administration. 
Typically, all of settlors, beneficiaries, 
investments and income are foreign. 
Point (e) is clear: foreign residents can 
hide income in New Zealand for the cost 
(or toll) of establishing and maintaining 
a trust structure. A difference is that in 
New Zealand private enterprise charges 
the toll, rather than the government, 
which was, for example, the practice of 
the Cook Islands at the time of the ‘wine 
box’ scandal.
The Shewan Report concludes that 
New Zealand is not a tax haven, although 
Historically, countries did not help one 
another to collect tax, but globalisation, 
international concern about tax avoidance 
and increasing international cooperation in 
general have brought about major changes 
in this policy.
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foreign trusts might be categorised as a 
‘preferential tax regime’ (p.45). While 
correct as far as it goes, this conclusion 
may miss the target. The expression 
‘preferential tax regime’ usually refers to a 
regime that is carved out of an otherwise 
unexceptionable tax system to offer 
preferential treatment to an activity or 
group. For instance, until the mid-1980s 
New Zealand accommodated farmers 
with all sorts of tax preferences. In 
contrast, the foreign trust regime is part 
of the basic structure of the New Zealand 
system, which does not tax foreign-
source income derived by foreigners. As 
explained above, it is misleading to call 
the trusts rules a ‘regime’ at all, because 
the ‘regime’ is a gap. The gap is not 
unintended, but exists because of fiscal 
policy. The regime has more in common 
with, say, Vanuatu, which has never had 
an income tax. That is, the absence of 
income tax is fundamental to Vanuatu’s 
fiscal structure. For this reason, Vanuatu is 
an attractive base for passive investment, 
just as New Zealand is an attractive 
place for foreigners to establish trusts. If 
Vanuatu is a tax haven, and most would 
agree that it is, then New Zealand is a tax 
haven in respect of its trust regime.
Despite this categorisation, New 
Zealand’s tax regime is the subject of 
very little disapproval in foreign official 
quarters. Reasons appear to include that 
specialists understand that far from being 
calculated to help people to dodge tax, 
the regime is founded in robust fiscal 
principle, supported by New Zealand’s 
well-deserved reputation as a good 
international citizen. Another reason 
is that despite being available since 
1988, the New Zealand regime remains 
relatively little understood and relatively 
little used, a factor that may explain why 
Mossack Fonseca seems to have begun 
to employ New Zealand trusts in earnest 
only in 2013 (Reuters, 2016). It may well 
be that until then Mossack Fonseca had 
not been fully aware of the potential of 
New Zealand foreign trusts.
On the other hand, as Shewan points 
out, there is a great deal of concern within 
New Zealand. He said:
At a local level the messaging in 
the media focused in particular on 
concerns that New Zealand was 
being described as a tax haven, the 
reputational consequences of that 
and the unfairness associated with 
wealthy individuals being able to 
escape tax through using offshore 
trusts. One academic expressed 
the view that It’s shameful for 
New Zealand to be caught up in 
international tax avoidance.
Shewan concluded, correctly in the 
view of the author, that where there is 
smoke there is probably fire: ‘there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the regime is 
facilitating the hiding of funds or evasion 
of tax’ (Shewan, 2016, pp.42, 40).
Non-tax issues and recommendation
This passage calls attention to an 
unwelcome by-product of tax havens. 
This is that structures that can hide 
income from taxation can equally well 
hide stolen funds, facilitate money 
laundering, enable the transfer of funds 
to terrorists, and provide a secure haven 
for the proceeds of drug dealing and 
other illegal trades. These considerations 
led Shewan to recommend that New 
Zealand institute a register for foreign 
trusts, and that a copy of the trust deed 
and the following information should be 
supplied on registration: 
the name, email address, foreign 
residential address, country of tax 
residence and Tax Identification 
Number of –
•	 the	settlor	or	settlors
•	 the	protector,	if	there	is	any
•	 non-resident	trustees
•	 any	other	natural	person	who	
has effective control of the trust 
(including control through a 
chain of control or ownership)
•	 beneficiaries	of	fixed	trusts,	
including the underlying 
beneficiary where a named 
beneficiary is a nominee.
•	 For	discretionary	trusts,	each	
class of beneficiary [must] be 
described in sufficient detail to 
enable identity to be established 
at the time of a distribution or 
when vested rights are exercised 
(the naming of discretionary 
beneficiaries being impractical).  
[In addition, foreign trusts 
should] be required to file an annual 
return with IRD that includes – 
•	 any	changes	to	the	information	
provided at registration
•	 the	trust’s	annual	financial	
statements
•	 the	amount	of	any	distributions	
paid or credited and the names, 
foreign address, Tax Identification 
Number and country of tax 
residence of the recipient 
beneficiaries. (pp.52-3)
Relevant rules relating to money 
laundering and the reporting of suspicious 
transactions should be strengthened and 
information sharing rules reviewed and 
reformed where necessary. The register 
would be searchable by regulatory 
authorities, but not open to the public.
The government’s response was by 
way of a media release dated 13 July 2016, 
... structures that can hide income from 
taxation can equally well hide stolen 
funds, facilitate money laundering, 
enable the transfer of funds to terrorists, 
and provide a secure haven for the 
proceeds of drug dealing and other 
illegal trades.
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accepting Shewan’s recommendations 
with few variations (English and 
Woodhouse, 2016). Inland Revenue is to 
administer the register, at least initially. 
The Department of Internal Affairs and 
the police will be authorised to search 
it. The media release does not say so 
explicitly, but presumably Inland Revenue 
will also be authorised to search, as well as 
to administer. Otherwise, Inland Revenue 
would not be able to respond effectively 
to exchange of information requests.
A public register?
Meantime, the Wellington Dominion Post 
leader of 30 June had argued that the 
register of foreign trusts should be public, 
saying:
[Shewan] has too much regard for 
the privacy of wealthy foreigners. 
Those who want to use New 
Zealand’s law for complex and 
remote purposes of their own, even 
to ‘manage family wealth’, whatever 
that might mean, should accept 
transparency as the price for the 
privilege. (Dominion Post, 2016)
The Dominion Post’s argument misses 
several points. First, once the register of 
trusts has been established it is probable 
that New Zealand’s foreign trust industry 
will wither. After 2006 Australian 
residents, faced with much less stringent 
registration requirements in respect of 
their New Zealand trusts, almost totally 
abandoned the New Zealand regime. 
There is some reason to expect that the 
same will happen in respect of the rest 
of the world now that full registration 
is to be extended to them, though, to be 
fair to the Dominion Post, Shewan takes 
a different view. He says, on the basis of 
submissions from trust and company 
service providers, that many offshore 
parties who use New Zealand as a safe 
haven to hold their family wealth report 
their income correctly to their home 
jurisdictions (Shewan, 2016, p.18). It 
would have been informative to know 
why these clients use New Zealand trusts. 
A possibility is that they do not trust their 
home professional advisers to maintain 
confidentiality, though they do trust 
their countries’ tax authorities in this 
respect. (The question of communicating 
details of wealth to criminals is addressed 
below.)
Secondly, there is the basic practice 
of confidentiality in respect of tax 
matters. We accept this value for New 
Zealand residents; why not in respect 
of foreigners who trust us? It is not a 
question of accommodating foreigners 
who have criminal or similar activity to 
hide. If foreigners are foolish enough 
to try to use a New Zealand trust as a 
vehicle of concealment, checks by Inland 
Revenue, the police or the Department 
of Internal Affairs, sometimes initiated 
by corresponding agencies abroad, will 
discover them. If there are foreigners who 
would like New Zealand trustees to look 
after their money, being foreigners who 
have nothing to hide from their own or 
from New Zealand authorities, but who 
might not want their neighbours, or, 
for that matter, criminals, to be able to 
look them up, why should New Zealand 
satisfy the neighbours’ or the criminals’ 
curiosity?
Settlors as victims of crime
For foreigners, using New Zealand trusts 
as a shield against criminals is no trivial 
matter. The present author has not 
personally established foreign trusts for 
victims of crime, but he has met victims 
interested in employing New Zealand 
trusts to protect themselves in the future.
Currently, a major category of client of 
the New Zealand trust industry comprises 
people living in lawless countries where 
some officials and some staff of banks 
and other institutions with relevant 
information are willing to pass the 
information on to kidnappers and other 
criminals, who use the information to 
establish their targets, both as to persons 
and as to amounts to demand. Such 
victims are in a difficult position. Many 
would be happy to pay the taxes that 
they owe to their own countries’ revenue 
services, but if the revenue department 
itself is corrupt, simply paying taxes can 
lead to having your children kidnapped. 
Some New Zealand service providers 
have established and run trusts for people 
in this position, no doubt thinking it the 
lesser of two evils to save their clients 
from criminals at the cost of suspecting 
that the clients will be safe only if they do 
not declare their taxable income.
Neither the Shewan Report nor 
the responses of the government nor 
the Dominion Post address this issue. 
Admittedly, it is hard to see how New 
Zealand could observe its obligations of 
information sharing and enforcement 
of laws against tax evasion, money 
laundering, terrorism and so on while 
at the same time affording protection 
to foreigners who legitimately fear 
the criminal activity of gangsters or 
expropriation of their property by 
corrupt governments. The problem is 
that measures that can protect people 
from criminals are the same measures 
that one might use to hide undeclared 
income or the proceeds of crime. Some 
activity within the New Zealand foreign 
trust industry has hitherto served the 
first purpose, but Shewan suspects, 
with good cause, that it has also served 
the second (p.40). Some structures 
probably serve both purposes at 
once. The focus of the report, and of 
proposed government action, is on 
the second. Should there be action in 
respect of the first?
Many would be happy to pay the taxes that 
they owe to their own countries’ revenue 
services, but if the revenue department 
itself is corrupt, simply paying taxes can 
lead to having your children kidnapped.
Page 90 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 12, Issue 3 – August 2016
To unpack the question just asked: 
should New Zealand provide a safe 
haven for the fortunes of foreigners who 
live in countries where they are at risk 
from criminal activity? New Zealand 
might offer a service similar to that of 
Switzerland, which helped European 
Jews to hide wealth from Nazi Germany, 
though without, one would hope, the 
occasional sequel of retaining possession 
of property where owners die (e.g. 
Volcker, 1999). A related question is: in 
modern conditions, is it practical to offer 
a safe haven in this manner?
Possible safe haven rules
We can test practicality by imagining 
a possible system. New Zealand could 
establish the foreign trusts register that the 
government proposes, but could include a 
rule that for a list of named countries New 
Zealand would not respond to requests for 
information without giving the subject 
of the request an opportunity to submit 
that the request should be declined. The 
procedure could correspond to procedures 
for extradition requests: New Zealand 
retains power to decline to extradite 
prisoners on the basis that, for instance, 
New Zealand cannot trust assurances of 
fair procedures by the requesting nation. 
The author suspects that this approach, 
attractive as it may seem, is impractical, 
for several reasons.
First, declining to extradite on the 
basis of apprehension as to fair treatment 
is diplomatically awkward, but New 
Zealand will take this step in order to 
ensure that prisoners have fair trials 
and, if found guilty, will not be subject 
to punishments that New Zealand would 
not accept. In those circumstances we 
accept the diplomatic risk of offending 
requesting countries. But, somehow, 
when the matter primarily in question 
is wealth rather than life and limb, the 
implied criticism is more likely to be 
contentious.
Secondly, New Zealand will extradite 
both without and with a treaty. If there 
is no treaty, New Zealand retains greater 
powers to decline to extradite. By 
extradition treaties, countries mutually 
agree to limit their power to decline 
extradition requests. The corollary is 
that countries are careful about both the 
parties and the terms of their extradition 
treaties. But this care need relate only to 
the one issue: extradition. In contrast, 
double tax treaties relate primarily 
to the relief of double taxation, with 
exchange of information typically being 
the subject of only one treaty article. 
Negotiation of double tax treaties is 
not easy at any time; adding terms that 
in effect express a lack of confidence in 
the tax administration of the partner 
state would necessarily make the process 
more difficult.
Thirdly, there the treaty in question 
is a multilateral convention for mutual 
assistance, New Zealand will not 
necessarily know which countries will 
decide to adhere to the treaty. Further, 
such treaties typically provide that 
a requested state may decide to give 
notice of requests to its own nationals 
or residents, but not to the nationals 
or residents of the requesting country. 
Certain articles of the OECD Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters, to which New Zealand is a 
party, are relevant:
Article 4(3): Any Party may, by a 
declaration addressed to one of the 
Depositaries, indicate that, according 
to its internal legislation, its 
authorities may inform its resident 
or national before transmitting 
information concerning him …
Article 7(1)(a) [Spontaneous 
exchange of information]: A Party 
shall, without prior request, forward 
to another Party information of 
which it has knowledge in the 
following circumstances: ( a)  the 
first-mentioned Party has grounds 
for supposing that there may be a 
loss of tax in the other Party.
Article 21(1) [Protection of 
persons and limits to the obligation 
to provide assistance]: Nothing in 
this Convention shall affect the rights 
and safeguards secured to persons by 
the laws or administrative practice of 
the requested State.
Article 21(1) might permit New 
Zealand to decline to transmit information 
without hearing from a party that is the 
subject of a request, even where that 
party is a resident of the requesting state, 
but article 7(1)(a) would directly attack a 
structure whereby a resident of a country 
where tax information is insecure 
arranged for wealth to be hidden in a 
New Zealand trust to prevent information 
going to tax authorities who might pass 
the information on to criminals. Such a 
structure ex hypothesi involves a loss of 
tax to the state in question. 
It is not impossible that New Zealand 
could contrive a way to circumvent 
these rules for the benefit of threatened 
taxpayers in other countries, but even 
if that were so, it is not likely that the 
foreigners in question, knowing that their 
identities and tax affairs were searchable, 
would risk confiding their wealth to New 
Zealand trustees.
Cases of victims kidnapped in 
countries where information is not secure 
are tragic. It behoves the government 
at least to consider: (a) whether New 
Zealand should attempt to help these 
people; and, if so, (b) whether such help 
is practical in the context of the network 
of obligations that is now part of the 
international tax system. The author 
suspects that the answer to (b) will be 
no, which probably means that question 
(a) is moot. But government does not 
The Shewan Report is commendable, 
though one might have preferred it 
to include a section on the position 
of foreigners who are threatened by 
disclosure of their wealth to criminals.
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seem to have addressed the matter and 
the present brief article is not a sufficient 
basis for a decision of such gravity.
Discretionary trusts
This article has not addressed the 
question of discretionary trusts in any 
detail. They are mentioned briefly for 
completeness. The report recommends 
in respect of discretionary trusts that the 
filing requirement should be:
each class of beneficiary [must] 
be described in sufficient detail to 
enable identity to be established at 
the time of a distribution or when 
vested rights are exercised (the 
naming of discretionary beneficiaries 
being impractical). (Shewan, 2016, 
p.53)
It would seem theoretically possible 
to draft a trust that appears to relate to 
residents of country A, whereas the true 
intended beneficiaries live in country 
B. This fact may not be registrable for 
many years, until there is a distribution 
or until rights vest. Meantime, therefore, 
country B has no reason to inquire 
about the trust. Possibly other disclosure 
requirements will be wide enough to 
flush this kind of arrangement out, but 
the rules will need careful drafting. It may 
be possible to draft an anti-avoidance 
rule to require disclosure of facts behind 
trusts that contrive to escape the rules 
for registration by the kind of stratagem 
described here.
Conclusion
For reasons of space, this article is selective 
in addressing issues that arise in respect of 
foreign trusts in general and of the Shewan 
Report in particular. The Shewan Report 
is commendable, though one might have 
preferred it to include a section on the 
position of foreigners who are threatened 
by disclosure of their wealth to criminals. 
The report was produced with remarkable 
speed. It shows that issues of reputation 
risk for New Zealand may appear more 
serious inside the country than looking at 
New Zealand from abroad (Shewan part 
9), but reputational risk could increase. 
More decisive, however, are New Zealand’s 
increasing obligations to collaborate 
with other countries in suppressing tax 
evasion, money laundering, terrorism and 
other international crime. The rules that 
apply to foreign trusts must be reformed 
to enable New Zealand to comply with its 
obligations to its treaty partners.
If, contrary to the view expressed in 
the report (p.18), the implementation 
of the report’s recommendations leads 
to the demise of the New Zealand 
foreign trust industry, the real losers 
will be victims of kidnapping, theft and 
blackmail who live in countries where 
privacy of one’s personal affairs cannot 
be taken for granted. These people will 
in all probability be driven from New 
Zealand and be obliged to resort to one 
of the dwindling number of jurisdictions 
that, for the meantime at least, offer 
secrecy.
1 [1841] EWHC Ch J82; Cr & Ph 240; 4 Beav 115; 41 ER 
482
2 Land Transfer Act 1952 s. 128, subject to very limited 
exceptions.
3 Trustees must often wait until the end-of-year accounts are 
made up to know how much income they can distribute. 
The Income Tax Act allows six months after the end of the 
year to pay or apply income that will be treated as derived 
by the beneficiary in the year when the trustee derived it. 
This essentially machinery provision has no impact on the 
matters of principle discussed in this article.
4 Income Tax Act 2007 s HC 26.
5 Income Tax Act 2007 s HC 29.
6 This is not to say that the trustee is a ‘custodian trustee’, 
who simply looks after property at the behest of an ordinary 
trustee, though the result would not change if the trustee 
were a custodian trustee.
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